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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 The Minnesota Supreme Court recently held in State v. Lopez-
Ramos 1 that an interpreter’s translation of a defendant’s foreign language 
statements during a police interrogation did not implicate the Confrontation 
Clause. 2 The Lopez-Ramos court applied the language conduit theory to 
determine an interpreter’s translated statements were attributable to the 
                                                           
ǂ Alicia Neumann, Juris Doctor Candidate 2022 at Mitchell Hamline School of Law. The 
author is a second-year law student and current extern for the Honorable Becky R. Thorson, 
Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota. The author previously worked at the United 
States Attorney’s Office for the District of Minnesota where she developed her passion for 
public service. Special thanks to Ted Sampsell-Jones, wisest advisor and professor; Claire 
Gutknecht, most patient article editor; and John Freeman, world’s most supportive fiancé.  
1 929 N.W.2d 414 (Minn. 2019).  
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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defendant. 3 Finally, the court concluded that because the defendant was the 
declarant of the statements, the statements were not hearsay. 4 
 This Paper begins with a historical overview of hearsay, the 
Confrontation Clause, the right to an interpreter, the limited right to 
confront an interpreter, and the common law development of 
Confrontation Clause tests in America. 5 Then, it explains the facts and 
procedural posture of Lopez-Ramos.6 Next, this Paper argues that Lopez-
Ramos’s approach to interpreters’ translated statements is based on flawed 
precedent. 7 This Paper contends that Lopez-Ramos failed to acknowledge 
the changing demographics of the United States as justification for adopting 
a unified approach to this issue. 8 Additionally, the majority’s 
misconstruction of language translation led to its distinguishing of Lopez-
Ramos and applicable case law. 9 
 Therefore, to make the law more unified and protective of 
defendants’ rights, this Paper argues the court should adopt a disciplined 
approach: interpreters must be subject to cross-examination under the 
Confrontation Clause. 10 Finally, this Paper concludes the Lopez-Ramos 
decision will likely lead to continued violations of foreign language speakers’ 
due process rights. 11 
II.  HISTORY OF THE RELEVANT LAW 
A.  Origins of the Hearsay Rule  
Hearsay is defined as an out-of-court statement offered to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted.12 Generally, hearsay is inadmissible evidence. 13 
A hearsay analysis can be broken down into four parts. 14 First, a “statement” 
is either an oral or written assertion, or nonverbal conduct if it is intended 
as an assertion. 15 Second, a “declarant” is the person who made the 
                                                           
3 Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d at 420. 
4 Id. at 423.  
5 See infra Part II.  
6 See infra Part III.  
7 See infra Part IV.  
8 See infra Part IV. 
9 See infra Part IV. 
10 See infra Part IV. 
11 See infra Part V. 
12 MINN. R. EVID. 801(c).  
13 Id. at 802. 
14 Casen B. Ross, Clogged Conduits: A Defendant’s Right to Confront His Translated 
Statements, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1931, 1936 (2014). 
15 MINN. R. EVID. 801(a).  
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statement. 16 Third, the statement is made out of court. 17 Fourth, the 
statement offered must have been made to prove “the truth of the matter 
asserted.”18 
However, a statement satisfying the four conditions above may be 
admissible as non-hearsay if it is either a witness’s prior statement or a 
statement offered against a party-opponent. 19 A witness’s prior statements 
are admissible if the declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination 
regarding the statement, and the statement satisfies one of four conditions. 20 
A statement that is offered against a party-opponent to the litigation may be 
admissible if it is either “the party’s own statement, in either an individual 
or a representative capacity . . . or . . . a statement by the party’s agent or 
servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, 
made during the existence of the relationship.” 21 
The hearsay rule began developing in the sixteenth century, but it 
did not fully advance until the early eighteenth century. 22 In fifteenth-century 
England, attorneys commonly “confer[ed] privately with witnesses outside 
of court” and refrained from calling such witnesses at trial. 23 Chief Justice 
Fortescue explained the standard treatment of hearsay: “[i]f the jurors come 
to a man where he lives, in the country, to have knowledge of the truth of 
the matter, and he informs them, it is justifiable.” 24 Due to the 
discouragement of calling witnesses to trial, juries in the late fifteenth century 
                                                           
16 Id. at 801(b).  
17 See id. at 801(c). 
18 Id.  
19 Id. at 801(d). But see State v. Brist, 812 N.W.2d 51, 54–55 (Minn. 2012) (citing Bourjaily 
v. U.S., 483 U.S. 171, 182–84 (1987)) (indicating the admission of 801(d)(2)(E) statements 
does not violate the Confrontation Clause because the admissibility requirements for 
801(d)(2)(E) statements “are ‘identical’ to the requirements for admissibility under the 
Confrontation Clause”).  
20 MINN. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) (noting the statement must be either: “(A) inconsistent with the 
declarant’s testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, 
hearing, or other proceeding . . .  or (B) consistent with the declarant’s testimony and helpful 
to the trier of fact in evaluating the declarant’s credibility as a witness, or (C) one of 
identification of a person made after perceiving the person . . . or (D) a statement describing 
or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or 
condition or immediately thereafter”).  
21 Id. at 801(d)(2)(A), (D). The rule also allows admittance of a statement made by a party-
opponent if “the party has manifested an adoption or belief in [the] truth” of the statement, 
or the statement was made “by a person authorized by the party to make a statement 
concerning the subject,” or the statement was made “by a coconspirator of the party.” Id. at 
801(d)(2)(B), (C), (E). 
22 John H. Wigmore, The History of the Hearsay Rule, 17 HARV. L. REV. 437, 437 (1904).  
23 Deborah Paruch, Testimonial Statements, Reliability, and the Sole or Decisive Evidence 
Rule: A Comparative Look at the Right of Confrontation in the United States, Canada, and 
Europe, 67 CATH. U. L. REV. 105, 108 (2018).  
24 Wigmore, supra note 22, at 440.  
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received a “counsel report” which described “what had been or would be 
said by persons not called or not put on the stand.”25  
However, by the early eighteenth century, opposition regarding the 
admission of out-of-court statements at trial arose. 26 Initially, objections 
regarding the admission of hearsay statements stemmed only from those 
accused of crimes. 27 Some judges began to recognize the insufficient veracity 
of out-of-court statements, but nevertheless continued to admit hearsay. 28 
Eventually, juries’ dependence on out-of-court statements as the primary 
source of evidence in trials led to an increase in challenges regarding the 
validity of verdicts because the verdicts relied on untrustworthy hearsay 
statements. 29 As a result, courts started to question the common practice of 
admitting hearsay. 30 Toward the end of the seventeenth century, the practice 
of admitting hearsay statements, whether made under oath or not, “was 
abandoned in favor of one that required the testimony of the [declarant] in 
court.” 31 
In 1603, Sir Walter Raleigh’s trial for treason presented “one of the 
earliest recorded” and most infamous examples of hearsay. 32 Raleigh was 
accused of “joining the . . . Main Plot to depose James I and to place 
Arabella Stuart on the throne.”33 The trial involved the admission of a 
statement made by Sir Walter Raleigh’s alleged accomplice, Lord 
Cobham. 34 Lord Cobham provided a witness statement “before the Privy 
Council and in a written letter” regarding Raleigh’s role in a plot to kill the 
English King. 35 Despite Raleigh’s objections to the admission of Lord 
Cobham’s statements, the jury heard the statements and subsequently 
convicted Raleigh. 36 The court sentenced Raleigh to death, which resulted 
in his execution. 37 
In modern times, hearsay, like the testimony in Raleigh’s case, is 
generally inadmissible as evidence at trial. 38 Despite this general bar, there 
                                                           
25 Id. at 440–41. 
26 Id. at 448. 
27 Id. at 444.  
28 Id.  
29 Id. at 441–43. 
30 Id. at 441–42.  
31 Paruch, supra note 23, at 110.  
32 Ross, supra note 14, at 1936 (citing David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 S. 
CT. REV. 1, 38 (2009)).   
33 Ross, supra note 14, at 1936; see Sklansky supra note 32, at 38.   
34 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44 (2004) (discussing the Raleigh trial).  
35 Hon. Daniel B. Shanes, The Crawford Confrontation Clause: Governmental Involvement 
is Key to Testimonial Hearsay, 96 ILL. BAR J. 574, 575 (2008).   
36 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.  
37 Sklansky, supra note 32, at 38.  
38 See Ross, supra note 14, at 1937 (noting the exceptions for hearsay’s admissibility under “a 
federal statute, a contravening Supreme Court rule, or the FRE”).   
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are several exceptions permitting admission of hearsay evidence. 39 The 
Minnesota Rules of Evidence, similar to their federal counterparts, provide 
exceptions permitting admission of hearsay when the declarant is available 
but the availability of the declarant is immaterial, 40 or the declarant is 
unavailable. 41 
B.  Confrontation Clause 
The Confrontation Clause, in the Sixth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution, intersects with hearsay rules because the Confrontation 
Clause “allows a defendant to cross-examine a person providing testimonial 
hearsay offered against him, but this right does not attach to admitted 
evidence that is not hearsay.” 42 The Sixth Amendment guarantees “[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him.” 43 Minnesota has an almost identically 
worded confrontation clause in Article I, section 6 of its constitution.44 
The right to confront a witness is generally known to be derived 
from the common law of England.45 However, there are indications that the 
right originated from Roman law.46 The concept of the Confrontation 
Clause existed in seventeenth-century England before it was transported to 
the United States. 47 Historical readings demonstrate that the Confrontation 
Clause serves “to ensure [the] reliability of evidence.” 48 Courts have 
emphasized that the reliability of evidence must be tested through “the 
crucible of cross-examination,” which is consistent with the Framers’ 
intent. 49 
                                                           
39 MINN. R. EVID. 803, 804.  
40 Id. at 803 (listing numerous exceptions for when statements are not excluded by the hearsay 
rule, “even though the declarant is available as a witness”).  
41 Id. at 804 (listing numerous exceptions for when statements are not excluded by the hearsay 
rule only “if the declarant is unavailable as a witness”). The legislature defined “unavailability 
as a witness” as including situations in which the declarant is either ordered by the court not 
to testify, continuously refuses to testify, lacks memory of the subject matter, is unable to 
testify, or is absent. Id. at subdiv. (a)(1)–(5).  
42 Ross, supra note 14, at 1937.  
43 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
44 MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . 
. to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”).   
45 See Marshall H. Tanick, Confronting the Confrontation Clause, 62 BENCH & BAR MINN. 
16, 16 (Oct. 2005).   
46 Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015–16 (1988) (quoting Roman Governor Festus, “It is not 
the manner of the Romans to deliver any man up to die before the accused has met his 
accusers face to face, and has been given a chance to defend himself against the charges”). 
47 See Tanick, supra note 45, at 16.  
48 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).  
49 Id.   
5
Neumann: Criminal Law: Incompatible Approaches to Interpreters’ Translatio
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2021
756 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
Since its early adoption in the United States, the Confrontation 
Clause has been invoked in numerous circumstances. 50 Today, the right of 
confrontation is universally accepted as fundamental and is applied to the 
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution. 51 The right to confront a witness is crucial in 
criminal proceedings, particularly to “‘test[] the recollection and sift[] the 
conscience of the witness’ and allow[] the jury to decide ‘whether he is 
worthy of belief.’” 52 
Under a modern Confrontation Clause analysis, “if the state wishes 
to introduce hearsay at a criminal trial, the state must . . . show that the 
declarant of the hearsay is unavailable for trial.” 53 Absent a valid reason for 
the declarant’s unavailability, the declarant must be called to testify in court 
and be cross-examined by the defendant. 54 If a reason for the declarant’s 
unavailability exists, “the court must then make a determination of whether 
the hearsay is testimonial or non-testimonial in nature.” 55 If the hearsay is 
deemed testimonial, it is admissible “only if the defendant had a ‘prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.’” 56 If the defendant did not have a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, the hearsay statement is 
inadmissible. 57  
C. Right to An Interpreter  
In the landmark case, Miranda v. Arizona, 58 the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that criminal suspects must be protected against self-
incrimination due to the “compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings.” 59 
The Court found that any statements spoken during a custodial 
interrogation without the “use of procedural safeguards” violate a person’s 
constitutional right against self-incrimination. 60 As a result, the Court 
required law enforcement officers to administer explicit warnings to 
criminal suspects prior to any substantive questioning in custodial 
                                                           
50 See Tanick, supra note 45, at 17.  
51 J. Charles F. Baird, The Confrontation Clause: Why Crawford v. Washington Does 
Nothing More Than Maintain the Status Quo, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 305, 308 (2005). 
52 Michael D. Cicchini & Vincent Rust, Confrontation After Crawford v. Washington: 
Defining “Testimonial”, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 531, 534 (2006). 
53 Id. at 537. 
54 Id. at 537–38.  
55 Id. at 538. 
56 See infra note 103 and accompanying text.  
57 Id.  
58 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
59 Id. at 458. A custodial interrogation occurs when “questioning [is] initiated by law 
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his 
freedom of action in any significant way.” Id. at 444.  
60 Id.  
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interrogations. 61 The Court indicated these explicit warnings to criminal 
suspects must include the following: (1) they have the right to remain silent; 
(2) anything they say can be used as evidence against them; (3) they have the 
right to an attorney; and (4) the court will appoint an attorney if they cannot 
afford one. 62 
Despite the integral role the “Miranda warnings” play in our 
criminal justice system, Spanish speaking suspects tend to be less protected 
by this right. 63 Translations of the “Miranda warnings” can impact suspects’ 
understanding of their rights before they are subjected to custodial 
interrogations. 64 Miranda requires that non-English speaking persons who 
are read the “Miranda warnings” must also understand and comprehend 
their rights. 65 Imprecise interpretation of the “Miranda warnings” can be 
detrimental because inaccuracies “can result in unnecessary delays, 
mistakes, and even wrongful convictions.” 66 Nevertheless, the Minnesota 
Supreme court found that “Miranda warnings” do not need to be delivered 
rigidly, as long as the warnings are substantively accurate. 67 
 Under Minnesota law, a person accused of a crime who is 
“disabled in communication”68 has the right to have a “qualified interpreter” 
present at an interrogation. 69 Minnesota does not enforce strict education or 
professional experience requirements to ensure adequate performance for 
interpreters used in criminal proceedings. 70 Rather, the interpreter used 
during an interrogation is required only to be “qualified,” not certified. 71 
Despite the statutory requirement for interpreters to take an oath before 
translating, 72 “the failure of [an] interpreter to take an oath does not merit 
                                                           
61 Id. at 444–45. 
62 Id. 
63 Alison R. Perez, Understanding Miranda: Interpreter Rights During Interrogation for 
Spanish-Speaking Suspects in Iowa, 12 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 603, 603 (2009). 
64 Id. at 617. 
65 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470–71. 
66 Perez, supra note 63, at 617. 
67 State v. Dominguez-Ramirez, 563 N.W.2d 245, 252–53 (Minn. 1997).  
68 MINN. STAT. § 611.31 (2020) (defining “disabled in communication” as “a person who: (1) 
because of hearing, speech or other communication disorder, or (2) because of difficulty in 
speaking or comprehending the English language, cannot fully understand the proceedings 
or any charges made against the person . . . is incapable of presenting or assisting in the 
presentation of a defense”).  
69 Id. § 611.32, subdiv. 2.  
70 Id. § 611.33, subdiv. 1 (defining a “qualified interpreter” as a person who is “readily able 
to communicate with the disabled person, translate the proceedings for the disabled person, 
and accurately repeat and translate the statements of the disabled person”); see also State v. 
Sanchez-Diaz, 683 N.W.2d 824, 835 (Minn. 2004). 
71 MINN. STAT. § 611.33, subdiv. 1 (2020). For a more in-depth discussion of interpreter 
qualifications see infra Section IV.B. 
72 MINN. STAT. § 611.33 subdiv. 2 (2020).  
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suppression.”73 Law enforcement officers are required to ensure the 
interpreter explains “all charges filed against the person, and all procedures 
relating to the person’s detainment and release.” 74  
The Minnesota Legislature enacted the interpreter statutes “to 
provide a procedure for the appointment of interpreters to avoid injustice 
and to assist persons disabled in communication in their own defense.”75 
The Legislature acknowledged the importance of interpreters during all 
stages of criminal proceedings because “the constitutional rights of persons 
disabled in communication cannot be fully protected unless qualified 
interpreters are available to assist them in legal proceedings.”76 However, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court held “[t]his right is not a constitutional one.”77  
D. Restricted Right to Confront Interpreters 
 The intersection between the hearsay rules, the Confrontation 
Clause, and the right to an interpreter is crucial because they significantly 
impact an individual’s constitutional rights in criminal proceedings. The 
Confrontation Clause and hearsay rules influence a suspect’s procedural 
rights, which in turn serve to protect their substantive rights. 78 “When a 
witness testifies to another person’s out-of-court statements, a hearsay issue 
must be shown to exist for courts to consider whether the Confrontation 
Clause applies.” 79 If the court determines the Confrontation Clause is 
invoked, the witness may be subpoenaed to appear in court. 80  
Recall that some statements are considered hearsay yet may be 
admissible under a hearsay exception.81 This distinction is important 
because “it determines which evidence is subject to the Confrontation 
Clause.” 82 The right to cross-examine a witness under the Confrontation 
Clause is invoked when the witness is providing “testimonial hearsay” 
against the accused, “but this right does not attach to admitted evidence that 
is not hearsay, including evidence that falls within FRE 801(d) despite 
meeting the four elements of FRE 801(a)-(c).” 83 
                                                           
73 Sanchez-Diaz, 683 N.W.2d at 836. 
74 MINN. STAT. § 611.32 subdiv. 2 (2020).  
75 Id. § 611.30. 
76 Id.  
77 Sanchez-Diaz, 683 N.W.2d at 835 (citing State v. Mitjans, 408 N.W.2d 824, 830 (Minn. 
1987)).  
78 Ross, supra note 14, at 1941–42; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).  
79 Ross, supra note 14, at 1935.  
80 Id. (explaining that a subpoena may be invalidated if it is “unduly burdensome, 
unreasonable, or oppressive”).  
81 See MINN. R. EVID. 803, 804. 
82 Ross, supra note 14, at 1937.  
83 Id.  
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 Another layer of complexity is added because not only is the right 
to an interpreter limited, but the right to confront an interpreter is even 
more restricted. Under Minnesota law, an interpreter can be appointed 
either in preliminary proceedings involving possible criminal sanctions or 
confinement, or proceedings at the time of apprehension or arrest. 84  
However, despite the role interpreters play during criminal 
proceedings, the majority view in the United States is that interpreters are 
not witnesses against defendants under the Confrontation Clause. 85 
Consequently, hearsay exceptions are implicated because the majority of 
courts find translated statements are admissible as “statements offered 
against a party that is the party’s own statement.” 86 “When an interpreter is 
used in the process of the interrogation, however, the police officer acting 
as a witness at trial does not testify about the defendant’s statements – he 
testifies about the interpreter’s statements.”87 Therefore, query whether the 
“hearsay exception that allows testimony about statements made during 
police interrogation[s]” should apply or not. 88 
Finally, there is no U.S. Supreme Court precedent that directly 
proscribes the right to confront an interpreter used during criminal 
proceedings. As a result, the complex interactions between the hearsay 
rules, the Confrontation Clause, and interpreter laws intersect to restrict 
defendants’ right to confront their interpreters.  
E. Conflicting Common Law Jurisprudence 
 Originally, the U.S. Supreme Court admitted hearsay as evidence 
under the “reliability” test. 89 Under Ohio v. Roberts, if the state wanted to 
introduce hearsay evidence against a defendant, the state was required to 
show the declarant of hearsay statements was unavailable for trial. 90 If the 
declarant was not available for trial, the Court found that the hearsay could 
be admissible if it “bears adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’” 91 If a witness’s 
hearsay was deemed unreliable, the witness was subject to cross-examination 
under the Confrontation Clause. 92 Reliability was determined by either a 
                                                           
84 MINN. STAT. § 611.32 (2018).  
85 State v. Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d 414, 420 (Minn. 2019) (reviewing the majority view).  
86 Id. at 424 (citing MINN. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A)). This includes statements made by a 
criminal suspect during a police interrogation.  
87 John Kracum, The Validity of United States v. Nazemian Following Crawford and its 
Progeny: Do Criminal Defendants Have the Right to Face Their Interpreters at Trial?, 104 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 431, 435 (2014).   
88 Id.  
89 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
90 Id. at 65.  
91 Id. at 66. 
92 See id.  
9
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“particularized guarantee of trustworthiness” or the evidence must have 
fallen “within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.”93 The “particularized 
guarantee of trustworthiness” test granted judges unfettered judicial 
discretion that was vague, subjective, and led to inconsistent results. 94  
 In the landmark case Crawford v. Washington, 95 the Supreme 
Court abrogated the “reliability” test from Ohio v. Roberts, and instead 
adopted the “testimonial” standard. 96 In Crawford, a man convicted of 
attempted murder and assault appealed his conviction on the theory that his 
wife’s statements to police officers were improperly admitted. 97 Crawford’s 
wife made statements to the police that indicated her husband’s attack was 
not in self-defense, which refuted Crawford’s main defense.98 Crawford’s 
wife invoked marital privilege under Washington state law and refused to 
testify at trial. 99 As a result, Crawford did not have an opportunity to cross-
examine his wife. 100 
The Court unanimously held that “testimonial” hearsay, like 
Crawford’s wife’s statements, is barred by the Confrontation Clause. 101 The 
Court determined testimonial hearsay is admissible only if the witness is 
unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the 
witness. 102 Although the Court left “testimonial” undefined, it noted 
“testimonial” hearsay includes “affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or 
confessions.” 103 Notably, the Court found that “statements taken by police 
officers in the course of interrogations are also testimonial under even a 
narrow standard.”104  
 Post-Crawford jurisprudence reflects the inherent difficulty in 
determining the reach of the Confrontation Clause—especially regarding 
interpreters as witnesses against criminal defendants. In Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts, 105 the Court determined that forensic analysts who created 
                                                           
93 Id. 
94 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67–69 (2004) (acknowledging that the reliability test 
was a “[v]ague standard [and was] manipulable” because “judges, like other government 
officers, [cannot] always be trusted to safeguard the rights of the people”).  
95 Id.  
96 Id. at 51–54. 
97 Id. at 38, 40.   
98 Id. at 39–40.  
99 Id. at 41.  
100 Id.  
101 See id. at 51–53 (noting the Sixth Amendment language “witnesses” against the accused, 
meaning those who “bear testimony,” as justification for adopting the testimonial standard). 
102 Id. at 54.   
103 Id. at 51 (noting testimonial as “a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose 
of establishing or proving some fact” including those statements that “declarants would 
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially”).  
104 Id. at 52.  
105 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
10
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reports regarding substances seized from Melendez-Diaz were adverse 
witnesses against the defendant. 106 The Court found that the analysts’ reports 
were affidavits, which “fall within the ‘core class of testimonial statements’” 
covered by the Confrontation Clause. 107 Consequently, the Court 
determined that the defendant had a constitutional right to cross-examine 
the forensic analysts. 108 The Court emphasized that “[t]here is wide 
variability across forensic science disciplines with regard to techniques, 
methodologies, reliability, types and numbers of potential errors,” which 
justify the use of confrontation to test “analysts’ honesty, proficiency, and 
methodology.” 109 
 In Bullcoming v. New Mexico,110 the Court reaffirmed Melendez-
Diaz and held that the defendant had a right to confront the analyst who 
certified his blood-alcohol analysis report. 111 The Court determined the 
analyst was a witness who should have been subjected to cross-examination 
under the Confrontation Clause, similar to the forensic analyst in Melendez-
Diaz. 112 Again, the Court noted that documents created and used for 
evidentiary purposes and “made in aid of a police investigation, rank[] as 
testimonial.” 113 The Court asserted that “the comparative reliability of an 
analyst’s testimonial report drawn from machine-produced data does not 
overcome the Sixth Amendment bar.” 114 Lastly, the Court rejected the 
notion that unsworn statements should be treated differently than sworn 
statements for purposes of Confrontation Clause analysis. 115  
 In State v. Caulfield, 116 the Minnesota Supreme Court did not 
apply the language conduit theory when it considered whether analysts’ 
reports constitute testimonial evidence under Crawford. 117 The court found 
                                                           
106 Id. at 308–11. The Court rejected the notion that there is a “third category of witnesses, 
helpful to the prosecution, but somehow immune from confrontation.” Id. at 314.  
107 Id. at 310 (finding the certificates were created to serve as evidence to prove facts in the 
criminal proceeding).  
108 Id. The Court noted that “[f]orensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of 
manipulation.” Id. at 318.  
109 Id. at 320–21. 
110 564 U.S. 647 (2011).  
111 See id. at 652.  
112 Id. at 659–63 (recognizing that defense counsel’s questions could have revealed the 
analyst’s “incompetence, evasiveness, or dishonesty”).   
113 Id. at 664.  
114 Id. at 660–61 (finding that such “representations, relating to past events and human actions 
not revealed in raw, machine-produced data, are meet for cross-examination”).  
115 Id. at 664 (emphasizing Crawford’s determination that “any construction of the 
Confrontation Clause that would render inadmissible only sworn ex parte affidavits, while 
leaving admission of formal, but unsworn statements” is unreasonable because doing so 
“would make the right to confrontation easily erasable”).  
116 722 N.W.2d 304 (Minn. 2006).  
117 Id. at 308–09.  
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that the admission of a Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) laboratory 
report without allowing the defendant an opportunity to confront the analyst 
was contrary to his Sixth Amendment rights. 118 The court determined the 
laboratory report mirrored the “types of statements about which the Court 
in Crawford expressed concern.” 119 As a result, the court reversed and 
remanded the judgment. 120 
II. THE LOPEZ-RAMOS DECISION 
A. Facts and Procedural Posture 
  In May 2016, the State charged Cesar Rosario Lopez-Ramos with 
first-degree criminal sexual conduct. 121 Law enforcement discovered Lopez-
Ramos’s unlawful conduct when a county child protection worker contacted 
police regarding the suspected sexual abuse of a twelve-year-old child. 122 
Then, Worthington Police Officer Daniel Brouillet began an 
investigation. 123 During the investigation, the victim and her parents 
identified Lopez-Ramos as the only suspect. 124  
 After police officers contacted Lopez-Ramos and he agreed to 
provide a statement to police, an officer transported Lopez-Ramos to the 
county law enforcement center. 125 While in an interview room, the officer 
started a recording system and called the AT&T LanguageLine, a foreign 
language translation service, and requested a Spanish interpreter. 126 After the 
officer placed the call on speakerphone, the Spanish interpreter conducted 
the interview in sequential interpretation.127 During the course of the 
interview, Lopez-Ramos admitted he sexually assaulted the victim on one 
occasion.128  
                                                           
118 Id. at 306–07.  
119 Id. at 309 (finding the report was “clearly prepared for litigation”).  
120 Id. at 307.  
121 State v. Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d 414, 415, n.1 (Minn. 2019) (“Lopez-Ramos was 
charged with the sexual penetration of a victim under 13 years of age when he was more than 
36 months older than the victim.”); see also MINN. STAT. § 609.342 subdiv.1(a) (2018). 
122 State v. Lopez-Ramos, 913 N.W.2d 695, 699 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018). 
123 Id. 
124 Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d at 415.  
125 Id.   
126 See id. at 415, n.1 (Lopez-Ramos’s first language is Mam, his second language is Spanish, 
and he is not fluent in English); see LanguageLine Solutions, Over the Phone Interpreting 
Services, https://www.languageline.com/interpreting/on-demand/over-the-phone 
[https://perma.cc/M8JF-953T].  
127 Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d at 415 (explaining that sequential interpretation means “the 
officer asked a question in English, the interpreter translated the question from English to 
Spanish, Lopez-Ramos responded in Spanish, and the interpreter translated the response 
from Spanish to English”).  
128 Id. 
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 After the interview, officers arrested and charged Lopez-Ramos. 129 
Lopez-Ramos pled not guilty, and the case proceeded to a jury trial. 130 The 
morning his trial was scheduled to start, Lopez-Ramos objected to the 
admission of his recorded translated statements on Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause and hearsay grounds because the State was not going 
to call the interpreter to testify during the trial. 131 The district court asked the 
State to make a foundational offer of proof regarding the interpreter the 
police used during Lopez-Ramos’s interview. 132 In response, the State 
explained that neither the interpreter’s identification nor location were 
identified. 133  
The district court admitted the translated statements because they 
did not violate the Confrontation Clause or hearsay rules as the interpreter 
was acting as a language conduit. 134 The district court relied on the Nazemian 
factors to determine the interpreter acted as a language conduit and found 
the statements were attributable to Lopez-Ramos as the declarant. 135 As a 
result, the district court overruled Lopez-Ramos’s objection. 136  
 During the jury trial, the officer testified that Lopez-Ramos 
responded to the translated questions without requesting clarification from 
the interpreter. 137 Additionally, the officer testified that Lopez-Ramos 
admitted he sexually assaulted the victim.138 The video recording of the 
interview, which depicted Lopez-Ramos’s ability to fully participate in the 
interview, was admitted into evidence and played for the jury. 139 During the 
video, Lopez-Ramos did not demonstrate confusion, and he did not express 
misunderstanding of the questions the officer asked and the interpreter 
translated.140 
 During the trial, the victim testified that Lopez-Ramos sexually 
penetrated her. 141 “Lopez-Ramos testified in his [own] defense and denied 
                                                           
129 State v. Lopez-Ramos, 913 N.W.2d 695, 700 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018). 
130 Id. 
131 Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d at 415–16.  
132 Id. at 416.  
133 Id. (noting that the State argued the lack of verification stemmed from Lopez-Ramos’s 
prior failure to challenge the accuracy of the translation).  
134 Lopez-Ramos, 913 N.W.2d at 700. The Court in Nazemian relied on several factors to 
determine whether an interpreter’s statements should be attributed to the defendant under 
a language conduit theory. United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 527 (9th Cir. 1991). 
For an in-depth discussion of the Nazemian factors see infra Section IV.C. 
135 Id.  
136 Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d 414, 416 (Minn. 2019). 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id.  
140 Id.  
141 Id. 
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having any sexual contact with the victim.” 142 During his testimony, Lopez-
Ramos alleged he was intoxicated during the interview and did not 
understand some of the officer’s questions throughout the interview. 143 On 
cross-examination, Lopez-Ramos admitted he understood the officer’s 
questions and the translation.144 “On December 15, 2016, the jury found 
Lopez-Ramos guilty of first-degree [criminal sexual conduct].” 145 The district 
court convicted Lopez-Ramos and sentenced him to 144 months in 
prison. 146 
 Lopez-Ramos appealed the decision, and the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals upheld the district court’s ruling. 147 First, the court held the 
Nazemian factors were properly applied to determine the interpreter’s 
translation was attributable to Lopez-Ramos.148 Second, the court held the 
Confrontation Clause did not apply because Lopez-Ramos was the 
declarant, thus he could not be denied the opportunity to confront 
himself. 149 Finally, the court concluded that the statements were admissible 
over Lopez-Ramos’s hearsay objection because the statements could be 
categorized as admissions by a party-opponent under Minnesota Rule of 
Evidence 801(d)(2). 150 
B. The Majority Opinion 
Lopez-Ramos appealed the appellate court’s decision, arguing the 
admission of his translated statements violated the Confrontation Clause 
and that the translated statements were inadmissible as hearsay. 151 The 
Minnesota Supreme Court ruled in favor of the State on both issues. 152 
Although the majority found that the facts of the case were materially 
different from Crawford, the court applied the underlying principle of 
Crawford to find that the interpreter was not a witness against Lopez-
Ramos. 153 The majority analyzed the process of language translation based 
                                                           
142 Id.  
143 Id.  
144 State v. Lopez-Ramos, 913 N.W.2d 695, 700 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018). 
145 Id.   
146 Id. at 700–01.  
147 Id. at 710.  
148 Id.  
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 709–10.  
151 State v. Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d 414, 417 (Minn. 2019) (arguing the admission of his 
translated statements violated the Confrontation Clause and the translated statements were 
inadmissible as hearsay).  
152 Id. at 423.   
153 Id. at 419–20 (finding the interpreter was not a witness against Lopez-Ramos because the 
interpreter does not bear testimony like the wife in Crawford did, and language translation 
“does not transform the interpreter into a witness against the defendant”).  
14
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on its simplified view of an interpreter’s role. 154 The court concluded that 
Lopez-Ramos was the declarant of the admitted statements, thus his 
Confrontation Clause rights were not violated. 155 The majority reasoned the 
interpreter was acting as a language conduit, consistent with Nazemian. 156  
The majority distinguished the case from Bullcoming v. New 
Mexico and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts. 157 Again, focusing on the 
“simple” process of translating a language, the court determined an 
“interpreter is more like a court reporter” than a forensic laboratory 
analyst. 158 Because the majority already held that Lopez-Ramos was the 
declarant of the admitted statements, it found his hearsay challenge lacked 
merit. 159 As a result, the court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. 160 
C. The Dissenting Opinion 
The dissenting opinion written by Justice Hudson, joined by 
Justices Lillehaug and Thissen, argued that the majority decision violated 
“the Sixth Amendment by permitting the State to introduce testimonial 
statements made by an unidentified interpreter . . . without calling that 
interpreter as a witness.” 161 The dissent reasoned that the language-conduit 
theory is unsupported by Minnesota precedent 162 and is undermined by the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts and 
Bullcoming v. New Mexico. 163 The dissent drew parallels between Caulfield, 
Melendez-Diaz, and Bullcoming to argue Lopez-Ramos’s conviction should 
be reversed. 164 The dissent rejected the majority’s view that United States v. 
                                                           
154 Id. (declaring an interpreter’s role “is not to provide or vary context . . . [but] to relay what 
the defendant said in another language”). The majority added that an “interpreter is simply 
the vehicle for conversion” and asserted that an “interpreter simply makes the language-
conversion process more efficient and effective.” Id. at 419.  
155 Id. at 420. 
156 Id. The majority agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Nazemian that “a generally 
unbiased and adequately skilled” interpreter “simply serves as a ‘language conduit.’” Id. 
(emphasis added).  
157 Id. at 421–22. 
158 Id. at 422 (insisting that both interpreters and court reporters translate one form of 
communication to another, “conveying information but not adding context”).  
159 Id. at 423. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. (Hudson, J., dissenting).   
162 Id. at 425 (citing State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304 (Minn. 2006)).  
163 Id. (Hudson, J., dissenting) (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) 
and Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011)).  
164 Id. (comparing the primary evidence used in the stated cases and Lopez-Ramos was a 
report, created by someone who was not called to testify, which was admitted and led to a 
conviction). The dissent also highlighted the fact that the interpreter used during Lopez-
Ramos’s interview was never identified, including the interpreter’s full name and location. 
Id.  
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Charles and Taylor v. State were inapplicable, and instead asserted that both 
cases support a finding against the language conduit theory. 165 
The dissent acknowledged the complexities of language translation 
while drawing parallels between “the translation process and between each 
step of the chemical-analysis process . . . .” 166 The dissent emphasized 
Crawford’s holding that the Confrontation Clause guarantees individuals the 
right to cross-examine witnesses against them.167 The dissent criticized the 
majority’s boasting of sections 611.30 through 611.34 of the Minnesota 
Statutes and the Minnesota Code of Professional Responsibility for 
Interpreters because “those protections are irrelevant to a Confrontation 
Clause analysis” and “Lopez-Ramos did not receive those protections.” 168 
The dissent concluded that the interpreter was the declarant of the hearsay 
statement, the statement was testimonial, and the district court erred when 
it denied Lopez-Ramos’s motion to suppress the statement. 169 The dissent 
asserted that Lopez-Ramos’s conviction should have been reversed and 
remanded for a new trial—where the State could have offered the “live 
testimony of the AT&T interpreter, or [brought] a different interpreter . . . 
[to] translate Lopez-Ramos’s recorded statement.” 170 
Lopez-Ramos’s petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme 
Court was denied on January 13, 2020. 171 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 The majority erred by applying the Nazemian test to determine 
the interpreter in Lopez-Ramos was acting as a language conduit. 172 Even 
though the court reflected on the importance of interpreters in the criminal 
justice system,173 the court failed to consider the changing demographics of 
the United States. 174 The court’s oversimplified construction of language 
                                                           
165 Id. The dissent notes that the language conduit theory requires judges to “‘make a 
threshold determination of the interpreter’s honesty, proficiency, and methodology without 
testimony from the one witness whose testimony could best prove the accuracy of the 
interpretations—the interpreter himself or herself.’” Id. (citing Taylor v. State, 130 A.3d 509, 
539 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016) (emphasis added)).  
166 Id. at 426 (including adding context and nuance, applying knowledge, and potentially 
making mistakes throughout the process). 
167 Id. at 427.  
168 Id. at 428 (highlighting that the interpreter in this case did not take an oath before 
translating Lopez-Ramos’s statements and was not subject to a code of conduct).  
169 Id. at 429.  
170 Id.  
171 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lopez-Ramos v. Minnesota, 140 S. Ct. 845 (2020) (No. 19-
5936).  
172 Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d at 420.  
173 Id. at 419–20 (reviewing MINN. STAT. §§ 611.30–.34 (2018) and CODE OF PRO. RESP. FOR 
INTERPRETERS IN MINN. STATE CT. SYS. Canon 1).  
174 See infra Section IV.A. 
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translation misguided its decision to apply the language conduit theory. 175 As 
a result of the implicit conflict between Nazemian and post-Crawford 
jurisprudence, 176 the court should have adopted a disciplined approach to 
determine whether interpreters’ translations constitute hearsay. 177 
Consequently, the majority erred when it distinguished interpreters from 
forensic analysts for the purposes of the analyses in both Melendez-Diaz 
and Bullcoming. 178 Instead, the court should have rejected the language 
conduit theory and mirrored other circuit court approaches like Taylor and 
Charles. 179  
A. Changing Demographics of the United States 
As the majority in Lopez-Ramos acknowledged, interpreters play 
an incredibly important role in the criminal justice system. 180 However, the 
court failed to acknowledge the changing demographics of the United 
States. The court should have recognized the evolving demographics and 
set clear precedent regarding the use of interpreters to ensure constitutional 
protection for all foreign language speaking defendants. Certainty in this 
area of law is crucial “in a country where over three million people cannot 
understand English and where interpreters are used 350,000 times each 
year in its courts.” 181 
 “In 1980, 23.1 million people spoke a language other than English 
at home . . . .” 182 Whereas in 2010, the national census showed that over 60 
million people reported they spoke a language other than English at 
home.183 According to the United States Census Bureau, “as of 2010, 
approximately forty million foreign-born individuals reside in the United 
States, an increase of approximately nine million over the same population 
                                                           
175 See infra Section IV.B. 
176 See infra Section IV.C.; Taylor v. State, 130 A.3d 509, 539 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016) 
(finding the Nazemian analysis fails to withstand “scrutiny under the Supreme Court’s current 
jurisprudence”); see also United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1140 (9th. Cir. 2012).   
177 See infra Section VI.D.  
178 Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d at 421 (arguing interpreters do not add context while “simply 
convert[ing] information from one language to another”); see also Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311–14 (2009) (holding forensic analysts are subject to the 
Confrontation Clause because they are adverse to the defendant); Bullcoming v. New 
Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 663 (2011) (holding the admission of an analyst’s certification 
rendered the analyst a witness subject to cross-examination under the Confrontation Clause).  
179 Taylor, 130 A.3d at 524; United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2013).  
180 Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d at 419.  
181 Kracum, supra note 87, at 434.   
182 CAMILLE RYAN, AM. CMTY. SURV. REPS., LANGUAGE USE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011 
3 (2013) (noting this was a 158% increase, while the population grew only 38%).  
183 Id. at 3. 
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ten years earlier.” 184 More than twenty-two percent of those individuals 
reported they spoke English either “not well” or “not at all.” 185 
The majority of the population who reported speaking a non-
English language at home spoke Spanish. 186 The Census Bureau noted that 
the percentage of the total United States population who spoke Spanish 
“increased from 2005 to 2011.”187 The largest numeric growth in languages 
other than English spoken in the United States was for Spanish speakers. 188 
Notably, in 2011, over fifty percent of individuals who spoke Spanish and 
reported they spoke English less than “very well,” were below the poverty 
line. 189 
Mirroring the increasing number of Spanish speakers in the United 
States, the number of Spanish speaking persons in Minnesota is also 
rising. 190 In Minnesota, over ten percent of the state’s population reported 
they spoke a non-English language at home in the 2010 national census. 191 
But nearly nineteen percent of Minnesota’s total population reported they 
spoke English either “not well” or “not at all.” 192 Almost ten years later, 
based on the 2018 American Community Survey, approximately twelve 
percent of Minnesotans spoke a language other than English at home.193  
In response to the increase in non-English speakers in Minnesota, 
the Minnesota Judicial Branch attempted to improve interpreter access in 
the courts. 194 The Minnesota Judicial Branch created the Court Interpreter 
Program (CIP) in 1999 to address access to interpreters in Minnesota 
courts. 195 The CIP is tasked with “interpreter testing and certification, 
maintaining and publishing the interpreter roster, recruitment and training 
of new interpreters . . . developing and implementing language access and 
interpreter polices, [and] the training of court staff and judicial officers . . . 
.” 196 The CIP coordinator collects court interpreter utilization statistics to 
analyze the needs of court users in Minnesota. 197 However, interpreter use 
                                                           
184 Kracum, supra note 87, at 431–32. 
185 RYAN, supra note 182, at 3.  
186 Id. (totaling over 37 million people who spoke Spanish or Spanish Creole).  
187 Id. at 5.  
188 Id. (indicating that 25.9 million more people speak Spanish in 2010 compared to 1980).  
189 Id. at 9.  
190 See id. at 11. 
191 Id.  
192 Id.  
193 MINN. STATE DEMOGRAPHIC CTR., DEP’T. OF ADMIN., Immigration & Language, 
https://mn.gov/admin/demography/data-by-topic/immigration-language/ 
[https://perma.cc/9Z2Q-22P2]. 
194 MINN. JUD. BRANCH, LANGUAGE ACCESS PLAN FOR THE MINNESOTA JUDICIAL BRANCH 
7 (2016). 
195 Id. at 12.  
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 13.  
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reports and “U.S. Census reports do not always reflect the actual language 
needs of the communities served by the court . . . .” 198 
In 2014, the most common language for which interpreters were 
used in Minnesota courts was Spanish. 199 “Spanish speakers account[ed] for 
55% of the non-English needs of Minnesota court users, and is usually at 
the top of most district courts’ top languages . . . .” 200 At the end of 2012, 
there were over 92,000 non-citizen inmates in federal and state prisons. 201 
Consequently, there was a 13.8% increase in the number of annual 
interpretation events in federal district courts. 202 In fiscal year 2013, district 
courts reported that they used interpreters more than 330,000 times, 
compared to approximately 325,000 times in fiscal year 2012. 203 Spanish was 
the most commonly used language for interpreters in federal district courts, 
comprising over 96% of interpreter use during 2012 and 2013.204  
Although access to interpreters is heavily regulated in Minnesota 
courts, the same is not necessarily true for interpreters used during 
interrogations. 205 The Minnesota Judicial Branch imposes an “order of 
preference for utilization” of interpreters based on their certification.206 The 
Minnesota Judicial Branch focused its efforts on ensuring proper training 
and certification for interpreters used in the courts, rather than the early 
stages of criminal proceedings. The lack of strict requirements for 
interpreters used outside of court hearings is problematic for non-English 
speaking individuals who need an interpreter immediately following arrest 
because the quality of the interpreter is likely at its lowest in the earliest 
stages of the criminal proceedings due to the low certification 
requirements. 207 Unfortunately, the early stages of criminal proceedings, like 
                                                           
198 Id. (noting individuals “may not be availing themselves of court services precisely because 
of a real or perceived lack of language access resources in the district courts”).  
199 Id. at 8.  
200 Id.  
201 Id. at 41. 
202 Kracum, supra note 87, at 432.  
203 ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., PUBLIC ACCESSIBILITY AND SERVICE ANNUAL REPORT 
(2013), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/public-accessibility-and-service-annual-
report-2013 [https://perma.cc/ECX9-R4Z8].  
204 Id.  
205 Compare MINN. STAT. § 611.32, subdiv. 2 (2018), with State v. Sanchez-Diaz, 683 N.W.2d 
824, 835 (Minn. 2004) (finding interpreters only need to be “qualified” not certified), and 
MINN. JUD. BRANCH, supra note 194 at 17 (asserting the Minnesota Judicial Branch’s policy 
is to “provide qualified spoken-language . . . interpreters . . . in all court proceedings”).  
206 MINN. JUD. BRANCH, supra note 194 at 17, n.27. The Minnesota Judicial Branch 
prioritizes the use of certified interpreters based on availability. “If there is no certified 
interpreter available after a diligent search . . . courts then look to employ another roster 
interpreter.”  
207 See infra notes 228–32 and accompanying text.  
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custodial interrogations, frequently form the foundation for convictions and 
eventual loss of liberty. 
Therefore, as the need for interpreters and the subsequent number 
of interpreters used in the criminal justice system increases, there must be a 
unified approach to challenges regarding the admission of interpreters’ 
translations. A unified approach to treat interpreters as witnesses against 
criminal suspects, regardless of which stage the interpreter was used during 
the case, will ensure equal protection of criminal suspects’ constitutional 
rights. 
B. Language Translation is an “Art not a Science” 
Language interpretation is a highly challenging task and is not as 
simple and straightforward as the majority in Lopez-Ramos presents. 208 
Notably, linguistic scholars “reject the notion that there are one-to-one 
equivalencies between languages.” 209 Language translation inherently 
invokes the interpreter’s discretion,210 which undermines the majority’s 
holding that language translation is merely converting words from one 
language to another “without adding conte[xt].” 211 
Language translation “has been defined as the replacement of 
textual material in one language [the source language] by equivalent textual 
material in another language [the target language] . . . .” 212 There are three 
different modes through which interpreters translate: consecutive, 
simultaneous, and sight translation.213 During consecutive interpretation, 
“the interpreter waits until the source language speaker pauses, then renders 
the original meaning in the target language.” 214 In simultaneous 
interpretation, “the interpreter conveys the target language message at the 
same time as the source language speaker.” 215 Whereas sight translation is 
“the oral rendition into a target language of material written in a source 
language.” 216 
Contrary to popular belief, most bilingual individuals are not 
competent enough to serve as interpreters. 217 Instead, an interpreter must 
                                                           
208 State v. Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d 414, 419 (Minn. 2019).   
209 Ross, supra note 14, at 1959.  
210 Id. at 1954.  
211 Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d at 421.  
212 Ross, supra note 14, at 1966. 
213 Elena M. de Jongh, Court Interpreting, 82 FLA. BAR J. 20, 26 (July/Aug. 2008).  
214 Id.  
215 Id.  
216 Id.  
217 Charles M. Grabau & Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Protecting the Rights of Linguistic 
Minorities: Challenges to Court Interpretation, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 227, 234–35 (1996); 
see also MINN. JUD. BRANCH, supra note 194, at 18 (asserting that bilingual staff may not be 
used for interpreting in courtroom proceedings). 
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“perform two functions simultaneously in the field of language and 
communication that otherwise are always carried out separately: speech (the 
expression of our ideas) and understanding (our comprehension of the 
ideas of the other speaker).” 218 In order to translate another language into 
English,  
An interpreter must listen to what is being said, 
comprehend the message, abstract the entire message from 
words and the word order, store the idea, search his or her 
memory for the conceptual and semantic matches, and 
reconstruct the message (keeping the same register or level 
of difficulty as in the source language). While doing this, 
the interpreter is speaking and listening for the next 
utterance of the language to process, while monitoring his 
or her own output. 219  
Language interpretation in the legal field should be subject to the 
highest form of scrutiny. Interpreters in legal proceedings play a significant 
role in ensuring criminal suspects’ constitutional rights are not infringed. 220 
An interpreter’s “presence and participation allow an individual who does 
not speak or understand English to meaningfully participate in the judicial 
proceeding.” 221 The interpreter should work diligently to “place the non-
English speaker, as closely as is linguistically possible, in the same situation 
as the English speaker” during court proceedings. 222 The “importance of 
language in law makes it doubly odd that courts would be so cavalier in 
considering the ability of languages to interrelate.” 223 While general common 
words may be easier to translate, legal terminologies “rel[y] on specificity 
and exactness.” 224 
Minnesota imposes strict requirements for interpreters used during 
court hearings. 225  First, court interpreters must pass an “English-only written 
exam, which assesses knowledge of the English language, court related terms 
and usage, and ethics and professional conduct.” 226 Second, interpreters 
                                                           
218 de Jongh, supra note 213, at 25 (emphasizing that the “two processes are performed by the 
same person, often simultaneously”).  
219 State v. Montoya-Franco, 282 P.3d 939, 943 (Or. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Cathy Rhodes, 
Court Certification, 1 ACCESS TO JUST. J. 1, 2 (Summer 1999)).  
220 See People v. Carreon, 198 Cal. Rptr. 843, 847 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (“Various courts and 
commentators have noted denial of interpreter services impairs not only the defendant’s due 
process rights, but also his rights to confront adverse witnesses, to the effective assistance of 
counsel, and to be present at his own trial.” (citations omitted)).  
221 Grabau & Gibbons, supra note 217, at 241.  
222 Id. 
223 Ross, supra note 14, at 1965.  
224 Id. at 1968.  
225 MINN. JUD. BRANCH, supra note 194, at 22. 
226 Id.  
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must pass an “oral interpreting examination that measures knowledge, skills, 
and abilities in the three modes of interpreting (sight translation, 
consecutive, and simultaneous).” 227 Third, court interpreters must 
“demonstrate good character and fitness as evidenced through a 
background check.”228 
Unlike the certification requirements for court interpreters in 
Minnesota, there are no certification requirements for interpreters used 
during custodial interrogations. 229 This is problematic considering 
interpretation during interrogations includes the discussion and 
consideration of Constitutional rights, “and mistranslation (for example, one 
that conveys a denial of guilt as an admission) may violate due process.” 230  
Interpreters regularly disagree about the proper translation of a 
statement because interpreters’ use of discretion while translating ultimately 
impacts the end result of a translation. 231 Interpreters invoke their discretion 
to use “more (or less) polite language; . . . inject or omit hesitation; use more 
formal . . . language; or introduce ambiguities.” 232 Some languages reflect 
cultural concepts that cannot be translated into other languages. 233 Similarly, 
interpreters regularly misinterpret testimony due to words that may appear 
similar “because they are derived from a common form but whose meanings 
in certain contexts are often completely different.” 234 Additionally, “both the 
translated interaction and the translator’s own cultural background influence 
the manner in which statements are translated.” 235 
In sum, foreign language interpreters exercise judgment and add 
context similar to the work of forensic analysts. 236 Interpreters are not 
exempt from making mistakes, nor are interpreters unsusceptible from 
                                                           
227 Id.  
228 Id. 
229 Compare MINN. STAT. § 611.32, subdiv. 2 (2018), with State v. Sanchez-Diaz, 683 N.W.2d 
824, 835 (Minn. 2004) (finding interpreters only need to be “qualified” not certified).  
230 Right to an Interpreter, 7 Minn. Pracs., Crim. L. & Proc. § 6:29 (4th ed.); see Ross, supra 
note 14, at 1934, 1965; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469–70 (1966) 
(emphasizing the right to counsel during interrogations is “indispensable to the protection of 
the Fifth Amendment privilege” because unequivocally understanding the consequences of 
statements made during interrogations is paramount).  
231 Ross, supra note 14, at 1965. 
232 Id. at 1965–66. 
233 See Ellen Frances Saunders, 11 Untranslatable Words from Other Cultures, MAPTIA 
BLOG (Maptia Aug. 21, 2013), http://blog.maptia.com/posts/untranslatable-words-from-
other-cultures [https://perma.cc/8D43-HM33] (describing eleven words that cannot 
be translated directly into English, such as the Japanese word komorebi, which describes the 
sunlight that filters through the leaves of trees). 
234 de Jongh, supra note 213, at 27 (explaining “false or party false cognates”).  
235 Ross, supra note 14, at 1972.  
236 Id. at 1978; see also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318 (2009) (noting 
“[f]orensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of manipulation”).  
22
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 11
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol47/iss2/11
2021] PROTECTING DEFENDANTS’ RIGHT TO CONFRONT 773 
succumbing to external pressures to interpret statements in favor of one 
party. Accordingly, the court should have treated an interpreter like a 
forensic analyst in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming to find that interpreters 
are witnesses subject to cross-examination. 237 
C. Inconsistent Jurisdictional Approaches 
Courts across the United States use different approaches to 
determine whether an interpreter’s translations are hearsay and whether the 
interpreter is subject to the Confrontation Clause. 238 The twenty-nine-year-
old holding in United States v. Nazemian 239 caused significant conflict post-
Crawford. Even though the Court in Crawford did not explicitly overrule 
Nazemian, the two cases are implicitly at odds with one another. 240 The 
inherent conflict between Nazemian and Crawford caused a circuit split: the 
Eleventh Circuit rejected Nazemian, 241 while other circuits continue to apply 
the Nazemian multifactor analysis post-Crawford. 242 
After Ohio v. Roberts, the Ninth Circuit adopted a different 
approach to hearsay and Confrontation Clause issues. 243 As a threshold 
matter, the Nazemian court considered whether the interpreter or the 
defendant should be viewed as the declarant of the out-of-court 
statements. 244 The court relied on several factors to determine “whether the 
interpreter’s statements should be attributed to the defendant under . . . [a] 
conduit theory.” 245 The factors included reviewing “which party supplied the 
interpreter, whether the interpreter had any motive to mislead or distort, the 
interpreter’s qualifications and language skill, and whether actions taken 
subsequent to the conversation were consistent with the statements as 
translated.”246 The court found that an interpreter’s translation of a 
defendant’s out-of-court statements did not constitute hearsay because the 
                                                           
237 State v. Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d 414, 425 (Minn. 2019) (Hudson, J., dissenting) (noting 
the majority adopted the nonprecedential language-conduit theory).  
238 See Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, Application of Confrontation Clause Rule to 
Interpreter’s Translations or Other Statements—Post-Crawford Cases, 26 A.L.R. 7th Art. 1 
(2017).  
239 948 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1991).  
240 Taylor v. State, 130 A.3d 509, 537 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016); see also U.S. v. Orm Hieng, 
679 F.3d 1131, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012). 
241 See United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319, 1327–29 (11th Cir. 2013). 
242 Ross, supra note 14, at 1955–56 (noting courts in the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits 
follow the Nazemian approach).   
243 Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522.  
244 Id. at 525–26 (finding that there would be no Confrontation Clause issue if the defendant 
was viewed as the declarant because a defendant cannot be “denied the opportunity to 
confront herself”).  
245 Id. at 527.  
246 Id.  
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defendant was the declarant of the statements. 247 The court concluded that 
neither a Confrontation Clause nor a hearsay issue arose. 248 
1. Acceptance of Nazemian 
In United States v. Vidacak, the Fourth Circuit found an interpreter 
acted as a language conduit, thus it declined a Confrontation Clause 
challenge. 249 The court determined the general rule is “an interpreter is no 
more than a language conduit” with an exception that “is applied ‘where the 
particular facts of a case cast significant doubt upon the accuracy of a 
translated confession.’” 250 After the court reviewed the Nazemian multifactor 
test, 251 the court found the “application of the narrow exception is not 
warranted . . . and the translation did not create an additional level of 
hearsay.” 252 The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning for finding the interpreter in 
Vidacak was acting as a language conduit stemmed from general principles 
of reliability. 253 Ignoring the reality of language translation, the court found 
the absence of evidence proving the interpreter’s “motive to mislead or 
distort” to be persuasive. 254 
Four years later, the Fourth Circuit again applied the language 
conduit theory to determine the admission of an interpreter’s translations 
did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights. 255 However, the court 
did not explicitly rely on Nazemian to determine the interpreter was a 
language conduit. 256 Instead, the court found Crawford illustrative as 
showing testimonial statements can be admissible “for purposes other than 
establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” 257 Consequently, the court 
rejected the defendant’s Confrontation Clause challenge because the 
hearsay statements at issue were “introduced as prior inconsistent 
statements.” 258 
                                                           
247 Id. at 528.  
248 Id. 
249 United States v. Vidacak, 553 F.3d 344, 352 (4th Cir. 2009) (relying on United States v. 
Martinez-Gaytan, 213 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2000), which in turn relied on Nazemian, 948 F.2d 
522).  
250 Id. (quoting Martinez-Gaytan, 213 F.3d at 891).  
251 Id. at 352 (citing Martinez-Gaytan, 213 F.3d at 892, which cited to Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 
525–27 to review four factors including: “1) which party supplied the interpreter; 2) whether 
the interpreter had a motive to mislead or distort; 3) the interpreter’s qualifications and 
language skills; and 4) whether actions taken subsequent to the conversation were consistent 
with the statements translated”).  
252 Id.  
253 Id.  
254 Id.  
255 United States v. Shibin, 722 F.3d 233, 248 (4th Cir. 2013).  
256 Id.  
257 Id. (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 n.9 (2004)).  
258 Id.  
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The Fifth Circuit similarly relied on the language conduit theory to 
determine whether an interpreter’s translations were not hearsay in violation 
of the Confrontation Clause. 259 The Eighth Circuit also found that an 
interpreter is generally “viewed as an agent of the defendant; hence the 
translation is attributable to the defendant as his own admission and is 
properly characterizable as non-hearsay . . . .” 260 Although the Eighth Circuit 
court did not consider the officer who interpreted the defendant’s 
statements a language conduit, it denied the defendant’s hearsay appeal 
under the applicable standard of review. 261 
Marking a shift in post-Crawford jurisprudence, the Ninth Circuit 
acknowledged the tension between Crawford and Nazemian while it 
considered a foreign language speaking defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
rights. 262 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit declined the opportunity to reject 
the Nazemian threshold analysis. 263 In United States v. Orm Hieng, the 
court held that the admission of a law enforcement agent’s testimony 
regarding statements the defendant made through an interpreter did not 
violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. 264 The court affirmed the 
defendant’s conviction under the language conduit theory from 
Nazemian. 265 In reaching its decision, the court applied the Nazemian 
factors because it could “apply Nazemian without running afoul of 
Crawford.” 266 
The court declined the opportunity to adopt an approach similar 
to Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming because “[t]hey do not address the 
question whether, when a speaker makes a statement through an interpreter, 
the Sixth Amendment requires the court to attribute the statement to the 
interpreter.” 267 Consequently, the majority of the Ninth Circuit panel 
distinguished an interpreter’s translation of a defendant’s statements from a 
laboratory analyst’s report. 268 The Ninth Circuit continued to follow 
Nazemian, noting its hesitance to abrogate circuit precedent absent “clearly 
                                                           
259 Escalante v. Clinton, No. 09-41055, 2010 WL 2802369 at *498 (5th Cir. July 16, 2010).  
260 United States v. Sanchez-Godinez, 444 F.3d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting United 
States v. Da Silva, 725 F.2d 828, 831 (2d Cir. 1983)).  
261 Id. at 961 (finding the error, if any, regarding the admission of the translated hearsay 
statements was harmless).  
262 United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012).  
263 Id. at 1140–41.  
264 Id. at 1140.  
265 Id. at 1139.  
266 Id. at 1140.  
267 Id. (finding the consequence is that “[n]one of these cases . . . are in direct conflict with 
our holding in Nazemian”).  
268 Id. 
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irreconcilable” decisions between the Supreme Court and prior circuit 
precedent. 269 
The Ninth Circuit’s application of the language conduit theory was 
premised on the assumption that “accurate interpretation by an individual 
with no motive to mislead or distort does not create a layer of hearsay.” 270 
However, this assumption ignores the reality of language interpretation—
which is inevitably subject to both intentional and unintentional errors. 271 As 
Judge Berzon argued:  
Translation from one language to another is much less of 
a science than conducting laboratory tests, and so much 
more subject to error and dispute. Without the ability to 
confront the person who conducted the translation, a party 
cannot test the accuracy of the translation in the manner in 
which the Confrontation Clause contemplates. 272 
Judge Berzon’s concurring opinion in Orm Hieng challenged the 
validity of Nazemian and the language conduit theory. 273 Judge Berzon 
viewed Nazemian’s holding as based “on a pre-Crawford understanding of 
the unity between hearsay concepts and Confrontation Clause analysis.” 274 
Judge Berzon also highlighted the significant tension between Nazemian’s 
holding and the U.S. Supreme Court’s holdings in Melendez-Diaz and 
Bullcoming. 275 Importantly, Judge Berzon recognized Nazemian’s “implicit 
trust in the accuracy and independence of interpreters” and the Supreme 
Court’s more recent “scrutiny of forensic reports.” 276 
Judge Berzon’s concurring opinion reflects the danger in the Ninth 
Circuit’s continued application of Nazemian. The Ninth Circuit’s reliance 
on its twenty-nine-year-old holding in Nazemian, despite clear conflicts 
between Nazemian and recent Supreme Court precedent, continues to 
muddy the waters in this important area of law.  
2.  Rejection of Nazemian  
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s approach, the Eleventh Circuit 
determined the language conduit theory should not apply to challenges 
regarding foreign language interpreters as witnesses under the 
Confrontation Clause. 277 The Eleventh Circuit correctly rejected Nazemian 
                                                           
269 Id. at 1140–41; see also Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003).  
270 Kracum, supra note 87, at 437.  
271 See de Jongh, supra note 213, at 27.  
272 Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1149 (Berzon, J., concurring).  
273 Id.   
274 Id.  
275 Id.  
276 Kracum, supra note 87, at 451. 
277 United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319, 1327–28 (11th Cir. 2013).  
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and the language conduit theory because an interpreter engages “some 
independent analysis when translating the defendant’s statements,” thus the 
interpreter is considered a separate declarant. 278 
In United States v. Charles, the Eleventh Circuit held that a 
defendant had the right to cross-examine the interpreter who translated his 
statements during a police interrogation. 279 The court determined the 
interpreter was the declarant of the defendant’s translated statements, thus 
a police officer’s testimony regarding the interpreter’s translation was 
hearsay. 280 The court reasoned that the statements were easily categorized as 
testimonial under Crawford because they were elicited during an 
interrogation.281 
Importantly, the court acknowledged the complexities of language 
translation to find that the interpreter’s statements could not be considered 
identical to the defendant’s statements. 282 The court reasoned that, post-
Crawford, the language conduit theory is inapplicable because it is premised 
on the court’s determination of the interpreter’s reliability, similar to the 
reliability test used in Roberts, which Crawford overruled.283 The court 
emphasized that Crawford controlled its decision because Crawford 
“rejected reliability as too narrow a test for protecting against Confrontation 
Clause violations.” 284 
The court explained its rationale for rejecting Nazemian was also 
bolstered by Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming. 285 The court was particularly 
persuaded by Melendez-Diaz because when “even the results of ‘neutral, 
scientific testing,’ do not exempt the witness who performed the test from 
cross-examination, certainly the Confrontation Clause requires an 
                                                           
278 Ross, supra note 14, at 1933; Charles, 722 F.3d at 1327 n.9 (“[The] interpreter’s otherwise 
inadmissible hearsay statements bear upon the basic fact that the interpreter is the speaker 
(declarant) of the out-of-court . . . statements that are being testified to in court by a third 
party. And it is the declarant who is subject to the . . . Confrontation Clause.”). 
279 Charles, 722 F.3d at 1323.  
280 Id. (finding the interpreter was the declarant of the out-of-court English language 
statements, and the defendant was the declarant of the out-of-court Creole language 
statements).  
281 Id. at 1323–24. The Charles court determined “testimonial” includes “‘[s]tatements taken 
by police officers in the course of interrogations’ . . . but also ‘witness statements given to an 
investigating officer.’” Id. (citations omitted).   
282 Id. at 1324. The court found that there were two different sets of testimonial statements 
made by two different declarants “for purposes of the Confrontation Clause” analysis. Id. 
The court reasoned that “the statements of the language interpreter and Charles are not one 
and the same,” furthering the notion that “[l]anguage interpretation . . . does not provide for 
a ‘one-to-one correspondence between words or concepts in different languages.’” Id. 
(citations omitted).  
283 Id. at 1327–28. 
284 Id. 
285 Id. at 1329–30.  
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interpreter of the concepts and nuances of language to be available for cross-
examination at trial.” 286 However, given the lack of clear binding precedent 
from the Eleventh Circuit or the Supreme Court on this issue, the court 
found the district court did not plainly err by admitting the statements 
without allowing the defendant to confront his interpreter. 287 
Similarly, in Taylor v. State, 288 the court reflected on post-Crawford 
jurisprudence to determine a sign-language interpreter’s translation of a deaf 
defendant’s testimony qualified as “testimonial” for purposes of the modern 
Confrontation Clause analysis. 289 The court did not apply the Nazemian 
multifactor analysis because “[u]nlike a three-judge panel from the Ninth 
Circuit, this Court is not required to uphold prior Ninth Circuit precedent 
that is in significant tension with Supreme Court jurisprudence.” 290 The 
court found the Nazemian holding was incompatible with Crawford because 
Nazemian “does exactly what Crawford forbids: it leaves ‘the Sixth 
Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence’ and to 
‘amorphous notions of ‘reliability.’” 291  
In reaching its decision, the court analyzed four pillars upon which 
Nazemian’s analysis rests. 292 First, the court found that “Nazemian uses 
rhetorical sleight of hand to distract attention from the fact that an 
interpreter makes assertions about the English meaning of what the 
defendant has said in his or her own language.” 293 Second, the court asserted 
that the language conduit theory “creates a legal fiction as to the identity of 
the speaker.” 294 Third, the court determined Nazemian’s “analysis depends 
upon an analogy to evidentiary rules regarding hearsay.” 295 Fourth, the court 
highlighted that “Nazemian premises the admissibility of the absent 
                                                           
286 Id. at 1329.  
287 Id. at 1331.  
288 Taylor v. State, 130 A.3d 509 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016). 
289 Id. at 521. The court noted that the “structured police questioning after a Miranda warning 
carried as much formality and solemnity as the interrogation from Crawford.” Id. at 523. 
290 Id. at 536.  
291 Id. at 539 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004)).  
292 Id. at 537 (asserting “none of which withstands scrutiny under the Supreme Court’s current 
jurisprudence”).  
293 Id. at 537 (acknowledging Nazemian failed to recognize that “interpreters must understand 
what the defendant meant and remember what the defendant said while simultaneously 
exercising judgment and discretion to convert one set of symbols to another without altering 
what the defendant intended to convey”).  
294 Id. at 537 (finding that the conduit approach “collapses the defendant and the interpreter 
into a single witness for constitutional purposes”).  
295 Id. at 538 (asserting that the Supreme Court recentered the Confrontation Clause analysis 
to the Constitution, rather than the law of evidence).  
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interpreter’s statements upon the apparent reliability of the 
interpretations.” 296  
The court concluded that Crawford, Melendez-Diaz, and 
Bullcoming “illustrate[] the correct application of current law.”297 As a result, 
the court asserted that cross-examination is the proper means by which an 
interpreter’s proficiency, honesty, or methodology can be tested.298 
Importantly, the court suggested that “Nazemian disregards the difficult 
realities of real-time language interpretation . . . .” and refused to call an 
interpreter a language conduit. 299 The court displayed clear disdain toward 
the language conduit theory because it requires the court “to endorse a 
fallacy or misconception that ignores the reality of language 
interpretation.”300  
D. Disciplined Approach 
Although the language conduit theory is the majority approach in 
the United States, this Paper argues that it must be rejected in favor of a 
more predictable and constitutionally protective approach. When an 
interpreter’s translations are introduced at trial, the interpreter must be 
viewed as the declarant of those translated statements. As a result, the 
translated statements should be considered hearsay, “thereby affording the 
defendant a right to confront his interpreter under the Confrontation 
Clause.” 301 
The Nazemian threshold test and language conduit theory are 
simply an “[a]lternative means of determining reliability,” 302 a standard 
which Crawford directly determined is inapplicable during Confrontation 
Clause analyses. 303 Throughout post-Crawford decisions, the Supreme 
Court clearly illustrated an intolerance for reliability as a standard for 
Confrontation Clause challenges. 304 Rather, “it is the interpreter who is 
                                                           
296 Id. (reemphasizing that the Nazemian multifactor analysis is “akin to the unpredictable and 
subjective multi-factor ‘indicia of reliability’ tests” which Crawford overruled).  
297 Id. at 539–40.  
298 Id. at 530; see also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318–21 (2009) 
(identifying multiple ways in which cross-examination is crucial to expose dishonesty, bias, 
errors, incompetence, or deficiencies in training, judgment, or methodology).   
299 Taylor, 130 A.3d at 564–65. 
300 Id. at 528.  
301 Ross, supra note 14, at 1959.  
302 Kracum, supra note 87, at 456.  
303 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61–62 (2004) (emphasizing that the Confrontation 
Clause “commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a 
particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination”). 
304 United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319, 1330 (11th Cir. 2013) (reviewing post-Crawford 
jurisprudence to conclude that the language conduit theory is precedentially unsupported). 
The Eleventh Circuit strongly emphasized, “[t]he Supreme Court could not have been 
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subject to ‘the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional 
demands,’ that is: confrontation.” 305 
As the Court asserted in Melendez-Diaz, the Sixth Amendment 
separates witnesses into two categories: “those against the defendant and 
those in his favor.” 306 The Supreme Court categorically defined forensic 
analysts as witnesses against the defendant because “regardless of their non-
accusatory nature,” they provide evidence contrary to the defendant. 307 The 
Court reasoned that forensic analysts’ reports are not always the product of 
neutral testing, but instead found “some of that methodology requires the 
exercise of judgment and presents a risk of error that might be explored on 
cross-examination.” 308 
Similarly, the process of language translation requires the exercise 
of judgment and discretion, which is inherently subject to errors. 309 As a 
result, the Confrontation Clause presents the best method of “weed[ing] out 
not only the fraudulent [interpreter], but the incompetent one as well.” 310 
“Just because a statement is non-accusatory, unusual, or supposedly neutral, 
does not remove it from the class of statements that require 
confrontation.” 311 Rather, given the complex process of language translation, 
and the important legal rights at stake when an interpreter is used during 
criminal proceedings, confrontation provides the most consistent means to 
ensure the utmost protection over defendants’ constitutional rights. 
Consequently, the better course of action in Lopez-Ramos would 
have been to remand the case for a new trial. 312 Ultimately, the court should 
have found the interpreter was a witness under the Confrontation Clause, 
and the interpreter’s translated statements constituted hearsay. The State 
could have “offer[ed] the live testimony of the AT&T interpreter.” 313 
Alternatively, Lopez-Ramos’s original Spanish statements could have been 
admitted at trial, then both the State and Lopez-Ramos could either agree 
to a translation of Lopez-Ramos’s statements, or each side could call its own 
interpreter. Nonetheless, a remand would set the precedent that interpreters 
are not immune from the Sixth Amendment and interpreters’ translations 
                                                           
clearer that reliability, absent cross-examination, is irrelevant for purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause.” Id.  
305 Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69). 
306 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 313 (2009).  
307 Kracum, supra note 87, at 445; see Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 313; see also Winbush, 
supra note 238.  
308 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 320.  
309 See de Jongh, supra note 213, at 27. 
310 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 319.  
311 Kracum, supra note 87, at 447; see also Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 315–17. 
312 State v. Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d 414, 429 (Minn. 2019) (Hudson, J., dissenting). 
313 Id.  
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constitute hearsay. At a minimum, this approach would lead to increased 
consistency within foreign language criminal trials in Minnesota. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Minnesota Supreme Court was presented with an opportunity 
to set a disciplined approach to challenges regarding the admission of an 
interpreter’s translations of a defendant’s statements under the 
Confrontation Clause and hearsay rules. 314 Instead, the majority improperly 
determined that the interpreter was acting as a language conduit and found 
Lopez-Ramos’s Sixth Amendment rights were not implicated. 315  
Because the Spanish population in the United States has increased 
significantly, courts should reevaluate their rulings regarding interpreters in 
the legal system. Specifically, courts should acknowledge the discretion 
interpreters use while translating languages and reject the language conduit 
theory. Although some circuits have properly rejected the language conduit 
theory, the Minnesota Supreme Court continued to adhere to clashing 
precedent that could lead to many unwarranted violations of foreign 
language speaking defendants’ rights. The Lopez-Ramos holding will 
inevitably invite further unfettered judicial discretion by lower courts, 
leaving little protection over foreign language speaking defendants’ right of 
confrontation. 
                                                           
314 Id. at 415.  
315 Id. at 420.  
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